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During the previous sessions, attention has been
centered primarily on scientific and technical aspects
of the space program. Today we are taking up sub-
jects that are less glamorous, but certainly just as
deserving of our best thought and effort. Maintain-
ing and improving the dose cooperation of govern-
ment, industry, and the scientific community is a
primary concern essential to mission success.
Almost every project NASA has undertaken during
the past 5y2 years has been characterized by newness
and innovation. In many ways the space program
has been without precedent. It is, therefore, not
surprising that along with our efforts to solve the
problems of space exploration, we have found it
necessary to devote a great deal of study to determin-
ing the best ways of managing a program of this
scope.
In our early efforts to overtake the lead of the
Soviet Union and gain preeminence in space, we had
to form an organization and draw together a number
of separate organizations and programs.
To accomplish this, NASA from the start has con-
tinually appraised its organizational structure and
management methods. We lfave made every effort
to meet the needs for change as they have arisen.
Problems have never been permitted to pile up to the
point where a major overhaul or massive reorgani-
zation was required in order to get on with the
mission.
NASA PROGRAM
This is not the time nor the place to go into a
lengthy discussion of the changes made over the years
in NASA's internal structure. In brief, our philoso-
phy is to limit our inhouse activity--except for a
relatively small amount of research for which existing
Government laboratories have a special competence--
to supervising, integrating, and administering our con-
tracts with industry, universities, and private research
organizations.
The discussions of this conference so far divide
easily into four general areas:
1. Manned Space Flight
2. Space Science and Applications
3. Advanced Research and Technology
4. Tracking and Data Acquisition.
Manned Space Flight Program
The Manned Space Flight program has as its objec-
tive the exploration and utilization of space by man.
Steps toward this goal involve the development of a
capability for extending stay times in space, the devel-
opment of techniques for rendezvous and docking in
space, and the capability for landing men on the
Moon and returning them safely to Earth by the end
of this decade. Integral with this program is the
development of new and powerful large launch vehi-
cles with the associated capability for constructing,
testing, and launching these vehicles and their com-
plex manned payloads. This has been and will
continue to be a difficult program, but one which we
have every confidence of being able to accomplish.
Space Science and Applications Program
In the Space Science and Applications program, we
are interested in developing our understanding of the
Earth and the space about it, our solar system, our
galaxy, neighboring galaxies, and the interplanetary
space; in this program we are producing the tech-
nology that provides the basis for the commercial
development of operational space systems such as
weather and communications satellites. We are study-
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ing the Moon, the Sun, and the nearby planets. In-
vestigations of the nearby planets include efforts to
determine the existence and possible forms of life on
their surfaces. The program also examines the effects
of space environment on terrestrial forms of life.
Advanced Research and Technology Program
The prime objective of the Advanced Research and
Technology program is the provision of a broad,
sound, technical base for this Nation's future aero-
nautics and space activities. Much of this effort is
conducted within Government, university, and NASA
laboratories. However, some flight projects are re-
quired to support the laboratory program. The fields
of interest range from propulsion to spacecraft, air-
craft, and human factors.
Tracking and Data Acquisition Program
The Tracking and Data Acquisition program sup-
ports all the manned and unmanned missions of
NASA. Its worldwide operation is an essential ele-
ment of the total NASA program. It is obvious that
from the space and aeronautics missions little will be
gained unless useful data are returned to our engineers
and scientists.
PROGRAMING CONCEPTS
We use the term programing in NASA to cover the
total process of establishing goals, breaking these goals
down into specific feasible missions, .Fghasing these
missions in such a way as to take maximum advan-
tage of each mission's results in terms of subsequent
missions, and applying appropriate emphasis.tothese
missions in terms of the country's and NASA's total
available resources.
An examination of our scientific objectives in space_
shows that a key element is the collection and evalua-
tion of data and information. This collection and
evaluation is a cyclic process (fig. 1). Gaps in man's
knowledge, whether in terms of basic natural phe-
nomena or in methods and techniques, excite possible
theories based on knowledge already available. Sub-
stantiation of a new scientific concept must be based
on flight experimentation. In other words, a theory
on the origin of the Moon must be translated into
measurable facts which support or deny that theory.
The measuring instrumentation is carried aboard
spacecraft designed for space-flight missions. The
actual data, once collected, must be returned to Earth
and thence to the experimenters who originated the
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theory and often developed the measuring instrument.
A comparison of the anticipated and actual data per-
mits either validation or rejection of the theory.
FIGURE 1.--Project cycle.
The advancement of technological developments
for space operations follows the same type of cyclic
process. Theoretical concepts are derived in Govern-
ment, university, and industrial laboratories for modi-
fied or new types of propulsion, power, stabilization,
guidance, communications, life support, structures,
and reentry techniques that might lead to improved
launch-vehicle and spacecraft capability. Experi-
mental models are designed, fabricated_, and tested to
prove or disprove the concept. Oftentimes this re-
quires extensive ground-based' facilities such as wind
tunnels, shock tubes, and space chambers. Ultimately,
as in the attainment of scientific objectives, flight tests
are required to confirm or deny the theoretical and
laboratory results.
The entire cycle for both scientific investigation and
technology advancement takes an extended period of
time because it includes the design and fabrication
of spacecraft, launch vehicles, tracking and data acqui-
sition systems; and development of computing and
analysis techniques. The new can build on the old
only at a given pace, and to force that pace or inter-
rupt it can be extremely damaging to the orderly and
economic prosecution of our space program.
There are three variable factors that must be con-
tinuously considered in the management of our pro-
grams, namely, performance, cost, and time. It is
possible to affect any one of these at the expense of
the_others.. _e.make every effort to attain required
performance within our budgetary authorization. We
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must take the time to conceive, design, build, and
test experiments of excellent quality and high value.
We relax our target-flight dates grudgingly, but we
must recognize that success is measured in terms of
the usefulness of the data received and that abortive
flights which provide little or no return waste valuable
resources.
The program that we develop, then, is phased in
terms of time and resources. The flexibility that we
must have in our programing is required by the un-
knowns that we face as we convert long-range objec-
tives into specific missions and experiments. Each
major program is composed of individual projects, and
most of these projects are translated into individual
flight missions.
In making a decision to hold a flight for further
ground test or for equipment modification, we must
consider the three factors: data return, cost, and time.
As the status of individual projects continues to
change, we must make decisions that maximize data
return and minimize costs and loss of time.
We have attempted to achieve these objectives in
our program through extensive ground tests and
checkout. Where warranted, we have provided back-
up spacecraft and launch vehicles to help insure data
return. In addition, we are conservative in our launch
operations. It is our policy not to launch unless there
is every reasonable assurance that the mission will be
successful. Flights have been scrubbed and schedules
changed to allow reexamination of systems, replace-
ment of suspected parts, and even redesign.
One measure of the effectiveness of this conserva-
tive launch policy is measured by the record of success-
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FIGURE 2.--Space flight record.
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ful launched, as shown in figure 2. In 1958 through
1960 the NASA record of flight successes to total
flights was about 50 percent. Since 1960 the successes
have increased steadily. In 1963 the successes were
85 percent.
NASA is the integrating force that carries the final
responsibility for mission selection and approach,
launch and flight operations, and data collection.
However, the growing success of our space-flight pro-
gram results from the efforts made by Government,
university, and industry people. We recognize that
these groups of scientists, engineers, technicians, and
managers represent our national collective knowledge
and capability in aerospace science and technology.
These teams have the capability of furthering our
understanding of space and advancing our space tech-
nology, and of applying these efforts to the general
welfare and security of the Nation. Because these
groups are important to our future well-being, we are
most interested in maintaining a well-directed, bal-
anced program that makes most effective use of these
resources.
UNIVERSITY AND INDUSTRY
PARTICIPATION
The agency has experienced rapid growth as an
organization and has had a commensurate increase
in its responsibilities. This growth is perhaps best
reflected in the resources NASA has commanded (fig.
3). Our first full year of operation, fiscal year 1959,
was at a program level of $335 million and a staffing
level of 9,286 people. In this fiscal year we have a
program of over $5 billion and a staff of nearly
33,000. The maturing of our organization and its
program is reflected in the proposed fiscal year 1965
levels of $5.3 billion and 33,800 positions.
The strength of NASA lies in its field centers (fig.
4). It is here that the work is carried out, either
inhouse or by contract. Our centers are widely spread
around the country and fall into two basic categories.
There are the former NACA laboratories, oriented
toward research and advanced technical development.
There are the newer space-flight centers, which have
grown up since 1958 with a flight project orientation.
It is these latter that are responsible for the major
contracting efforts of the agency. This distinction is
becoming less pronounced as the research centers take
on major projects such as the Centaur and Scout
launch vehicles, a biological satellite, and a high-speed
reentry probe.
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FIGURE 3.--NASA resources.
As our workload has changed and grown, so has
our contractor activity (table I). Before 1958, most
effort was inhouse and purchasing was limited to parts
and components and to facilities construction. In the
early NASA years, we began to turn to established
contractors who had been carrying out the Depart-
ment of Defense projects. Today, we deal with the
full spectrum: Universities that do research, that pro-
vide flight experiments and that train engineers and
scientists; nonprofit organizations that provide tech-
nical direction to industrial teams; and major primes
with responsibility for entire long-term projects. And
each of these is but the first tier in the long chain of
subcontractors, vendors, and suppliers.
TABLE I.--NASA Procurement by Type of Contractor
Type of contractor
Private industry ............................................................................
Educational institutions and nonprofit organizations ....................................
Jet Propulsion Laboratory ..................................................................
Other Government agencies ................................................................
Total contracts ......................................................................
Approximate percentage of NASA budget ...............................................
1960
$174.0
17.0
38.3
107.4
$336.7
65+
Millions per fiscal year
1961
$423.3
24.5
86.0
221.7
$755.5
80+
1962 1963
$1,030.1 $2,261.7
50.2 102.2
148.5 230.2
321.8 636.4
$1,550.6 $3,230.5
90 90
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How contracts are placed 
Directly by NASA ___.-.._______ 
Through JPL. ______._-..__._.___ 
Through other Government 
agencies.* 
FIGURE 4 . N A S A  installations. 
Portion of total 
Millions procurements, % 
$2,261.7 70.0 
174.8 5.4 
565.2 17.5 
Almost 93 percent of NASA's work is performed 
under contract with industry. As indicated in Ta- 
ble 11, 70 percent of the total procurements are 
placed directly by NASA, 5.4 percent through the Jet 
Propulsion Laboratory, and 17.5 through other Gov- 
ernment agencies. 
Some 2,500 prime contractors, located in 49 States 
and the District of Columbia, are engaged in NASA 
work. Something over $4 billion will be paid to 
industry for its work under NASA contracts this year. 
Less impressive from a dollar-and-cents viewpoint, 
but of basic importance to our program, is the re- 
search into the space environment-its measurement, 
observation, and use-that is being conducted in more 
than 100 university laboratories throughout the 
Nation. More than 4,000 experimenters are partici- 
pating in this work, in cooperation with at least 20 
Government agencies. 
C0"TRACI'ING PROCEDURES 
In view of all this, it is clear that NASA's con- 
tracting policies, practices, and administration are a 
key part of our overall management process. 
TABLE 11.-Zndustry's Role in NASA Program for 
Fiscal Year 1963 
~~ 
92.9 Total.. _____. _ _  _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _  1 3,001.7 [ 
*Army 5 5 7 6 ,  USAF 36%, Navy 476, others 5%. 
We have had to learn-sometimes the hard way- 
about the many ways that the form of an original 
contract will affect the quality of a contractor's man- 
agement and the end product that he contributed to 
the program. 
Much of our initial work, in particular, was ex- 
ploratory or "first-of-a-kind," and as a result NASA 
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has often been faced with a serious problem in its
endeavors to develop firm specifications and to esti-
mate costs in situations of substantial technological
uncertainty. For these reasons, many of our early
research and development contracts were on a cost-
plus-fixed-fee (CPFF) basis. This appeared to be
the best way to give NASA project management the
flexibility needed to respond to changes in techno-
logical requirements.
It was recognized, even at the time, that the man-
agement of such contracts could be influenced to only
a relatively limited extent by governmental adminis-
trative controls. This is not meant to imply, of course,
either a blanket condemnation bf CPFF contracts or a
dismissal of the importance of administrative controls.
On the contrary, they offered us in many cases what
was probably the only way to proceed with our early
proiects.
What we need to do, in the future, is to devise
original types of research and development contracts
whose form and provisions can strongly motivate
industrial management toward improving methods,
and ultimately, products. It is for this reason that
we in NASA have devoted so much of our attention
to ways of improving our contracting processes and
contract forms.
Because of varying practices in effect at a number
of the NASA centers, nonuniformities in administra-
tion of contracts has sometimes been a problem. So
many different elements were drawn together to make
up the new agency that this development was more
or less to be expected. However, we are taking steps
to achieve uniform methods as rapidly as possible.
There are still a number of important areas that are
in need of attention, and we are collaborating with
the Department of Defense in this regard.
Finally, improper use of letter contracts has some-
times been a serious source of potential trouble. These
lessen the Government's bargaining power at the
negotiating table. They often slow down the de-
finitizing process, and in extreme cases can lead to
situations which approach the illegal cost-plus-per-
centage-of-cost relationship. We have found the
letter contract to be a generally unsatisfactory way of
doing business, even if a cost-plus-incentive contract
is finally reached. As a matter of policy, we are
striving to eliminate letter contracts except in some
very special cases where a specific exception is made in
NASA headquarters.
It is almost always easier to pinpoint the short- ,/
comings of contracting procedures than it is to come
up with new and better ways of achieving the objec-
tive. We believe, however, that we have made con-
siderable progress in doing both. Without ruling
out CPFF contracts entirely, we recognize the chief
difficulty is that the profit is to all intents and pur-
poses built in at the beginning of a project, on the
basis of estimated costs at the time; it, therefore, does
not relate nearly so much as it should to the manner
in which the contractor actually performs.
Along with this deficiency come other problems--
different but dosely related. There is no real financial
penalty to the contractor who performs poorly, or
overruns his costs, or misuses his manpower by
pulling people off the job to help write proposals
being submitted in efforts to get other contracts. Yet
another important deficiency of CPFF contracts is that
there is no workable financial deterrent or penalty that
can be taken against a contractor that underbids the
job to make sure that he gets it and then escalates
the cost once the contract is firmly in hand.
There is no reward for efficiency, and no penalty
for its absence, eveh in those overhead and administra-
tive areas which do not relate directly to the technical
effort. There can be little accomplished by govern-
mental monitoring of such items because efficiency
stems from correctly making literally thousands of
small, day-to-day decisions by contractor personnel.
A Government followup would simply add that much
more to the costs.
To put things into the vernacular of the "carrot
and the stick," we are primarily interested in a bigger
and better carrot, but we recognize that we cannot
afford to throw away the stick. During the past year,
we have experimented with a variety of incentive v
forms of contracts. At the same time, we took steps
to begin converting some of our existing CPFF con-
tracts into some form of incentive contracts.
INCENTIVE CONTRACTS
We are searching for a type of contract that will
motivate the contractor to become more deeply in-
volved in performing work of high quality with maxi-
mum speed and minimum cost.
In this way we hope to reduce the number of per-
sons presently required to carry out what are essen-
tially policing actions. These would be largely un-
necessary if we could place more of the responsibility
for basic decisions of performance, time, and cost in
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the hands of industry management. Only through
such an approach can we hope to reverse the constant
escalation of costs that stems from adding persons on
both sides of the equation. This is, as the Govern-
ment adds people, the contractor has to add people
to respond to our people, and the result is not satis-
factory to either side.
Going into incentive contracting is not, of course,
an easy matter. It is hard to properly establish the
incentives in the manner in which they relate to cost
and schedule, and particularly to performance--how
do you measure performance? But these are the
things we are working on and think we .are making
good progress. We do have some of these contracts
working for us now. Table III shows our increased
emphasis on incentive contracts, from none at all in
1961 to some 30 as of April 1964.
TABLE III.--Emphasis on Incentive Contracts
Number of Value in
Fiscal year contracts millions
1961 .....................................
1962 .....................................
1963 .....................................
To February1964* .....................
None
1
7
23
$ 7
162
313
*At this date 18 additional contracts of over $5 million
each were also under negotiation with selected contractors.
Again it should be emphasized that there are three
factors we want the contractor to be involved in--cost,
time, and performance (fig. 5). We want contracts
to be written in such a way that industry management
will carefully weigh and consider what any change
in his operation will do to all three items. Obviously,
there cannot be an alteration in any one of them with-
out a concomitant effect on the other two. We believe
that only in this way can the present performance be
improved at the contractor level.
The incentive principle holds that a contractor's
profit should be related to his ability to: turn out a
product that meets significantly advanced performance
goals, improve on the contract schedule, substantially
reduce the cost of the work, or complete the project
under _tweighted combination of some or all of these
objectives. The principle is not a new one, but the
emphasis that it is receiving is new, and it is the
CONTRACTOR
FIGURE 5.--Incentive contracting.
core of a major evolution in NASA's procurement
policy and practice.
Probably the most important advantage of the in-
centive contract is that, since profit depends on how
well the contractor performs, there is an extremely
strong motivation for the con.tractor to do his utmost.
There is a further benefit in that the incentive ar-
rangement forces both parties to consider performance
versus schedule versus cost throughout the program.
The gains that we achieve through incentive con-
tracting are not achieved without additional effort,
and certainly not without incurring certain risks. If
the incentive contract places too much emphasis on
reducing costs, the contractor may be tempted to cut
costs at the expense of timely delivery or product
quality.
We believe, however, that this can be prevented by
weighting the various features of bonus and penalty
to channel the contractor's efforts to meet all objec-
tives.
In this regard, it might be mentioned that we are
exploring the possibility of incorporating much
sharper cost reduction incentives in those administra-
tive and overhead areas that do not affect the technical
effort. The objective, briefly and simply, is to tailor
incentives to each particular case, programmatically
and functionally.
This is also a good discipline from the standpoint
of NASA's internal operation. These remarks are
certainly not intended to imply that the need for
improvement applies to industry only; we are fully as
concerned with improving the manner in which we
carry out our business in-house. It is our aim when-
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ever possible, through careful planning, to define our
contracts more clearly and accurately beforc thcy arc
let.
It is clear that the Government's goal must be to
procure the maximum effective effort at the most
reasonable combination of costs and time. At the
same time, NASA needs to maintain flexibility in that
as many management and procurement alternatives
should remain open to us as possible during the life
of the project. And we cannot neglect our responsi-
bility of assuring appropriate quality of performance.
In terms of procurement practice, the ideal ap-
proach to a wholly new NASA flight project might
run along these lines. First, we would contract with
a number of companies for an advanced study which
would be designed to establish the broad concepts and
various approaches to a given mission or groups of
missions. Such contractors would be competitively
selected on the basis of the quality of the technical
teams they would propose to make available for this
task. This group of contracts dealing with the pro-
posed new project would normally be fixed price and
all funded at the same level.
After the results have been evaluated by NASA,
the next step would be a detailed feasibility and pre-
liminary design effort based on the work already done.
NASA would have the opportunity here of selecting
two or more of the study contractors based on the
previous competition or might compete again with the
thought of selecting the top teams that are proposed.
This phase of the cycle would normally be CPFF but
subject to careful direction by the field center project
management group. At the time the feasibility studies
are undertaken, it would be made clear that the follow-
on development effort leading to flight hardware
would, if approved, be let to the more effective
contractor.
At the appropriate moment in the conduct of the
parallel feasibility studies, NASA would select one for
continuation while terminating the others. The con-
tractor selected for continuation would then be
awarded a CPFF phase I contract. This would not
include flight hardware but would cover the detailed
design specification, bread-board models, and test
schedules required for the final project. During this
phase, the detailed project cost estimates and schedule
alternatives would be developed.
When the decision is made to continue into the
flight hardware stage, an incentive contract would be
negotiated on the basis of the total previous effort and
the agreed upon designs and testing programs. The
incentive phase would normally include the proof test
models and the first several flight units required for
missions accomplishment.
In the event that follow-on hardware items are re-
quired, two alternates are open: (1) a fixed-price
continuation with the original contractor or (2) a
fixed-price competitive contract based on the detailed
drawings and designs prepared under the previous
incentive contract.
This outline of the ideal procurement approach is
necessarily a difficult one to follow in that it requires _
the maximum NASA engineering effort prior to actu-
ally having a contractor on board and apparently
requires more time between initiation and flight than
other approaches. On the first point, greater effort
spent in the area of specifications and systems con-
ceptual design will pay dividends in the form of lower
total project cost and higher reliability and higher
probability of mission success. As to the second point,
sometimes the longest route really is the shortest way
home.
We believe that by establishing discipline in such
a way that incentive profits accrue from keeping costs
down, meeting or beating schedules, and maintaining
high standards of quality and workmanship, we will
afford maximum benefit to both industry and Govern-
ment.
What we are really striving for, in the final analysis,
is not some esoteric, far-out goal. We are striving
for mission success, while meeting our schedules and
staying within cost.
We have been making--and will continue to make
---every effort to ensure that working for NASA will
be attractive to industry, providing, of course, that the
work is well done. We want success to be extremely
attractive. Conversely, we intend to make failure,
sloppy work, or wastefulness of the taxpayers' dollars
extremely unattractive.
We believe that a contract should be designed to
encourage industry to be as proficient as possible,
rather than assume that industry requires constant
policing. If top industrial management is motivated
to become deeply and personally involved in the work
they are performing for NASA, the risks to them-
selves and to the Government will be minimized. By
proper use of this team concept, we believe it will be
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possible to achieve pre-eminence in space in this
decade.
GOALS FOR THIS DECADE
We plan to develop the Saturn I-B and Saturn V
launch vehicles capable of placing 34,000 pounds and
220,000 pounds, respectively, in Earth orbit. We will
have facilities for manufacturing, testing, and launch-
ing these vehicles with the Apollo spacecraft. We
will have tracking stations, tracking ships, worldwide
communications, and mission control facilities for
manned flight in Earth orbit and out to the vicinity of
the Moon. We will have a thorough understanding
of the space environment about the Earth, between the
Earth and the Moon, and we will have investigated the
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lunar surface and selected possible landing sites.
These major program elements are scheduled so that
a manned lunar landing and return can be conducted
in this decade. Technological progress, environmental
conditions in space, and dedication of purpose will
determine whether we attain these goals on this target
schedule.
These goals cannot be achieved without a proper
partner relationship of Government, industry, and
universities. It is the acceptance of this challenge
by all three participants that will, in the long run,
permit success or lead to failure. Our most difficult
job is to provide the appropriate framework of incen-
tives and controls that allows and nourishes this all-
important joint participation.
